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R.O.A. GENERAL, INC., a 
Utah corporation, WILLIAM 
REAGAN, individually, 
and DOUGLAS T. HALL, 
individually, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT ROLAND WEBB 
Roland Webb ("Webb") respectfully submits this brief in response to the 
brief filed on behalf of appellants R.O.A. General, Inc. ("R.O.A."), William Reagan 
("Reagan") and Douglas T. Hall (collectively "Appellants"). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Was the district court correct in finding, as a matter of law, that 
Webb's compensation under his employment agreement with R.O.A. was due and 
owing? 
2. Did the district court correctly find that the employment agreement 
between Webb and R.O.A. was integrated and not ambiguous and therefore properly 
refuse to permit extrinsic evidence concerning its interpretation? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case was previously before this Court for the purpose of enforcing 
Webb's shareholder rights of inspection pursuant to Section 16-10-47(b) Utah Code 
Annotated (1953). See Webb v. R.O.A. General Inc. 773 P.2d 834 (Utah App. 1989). 
No. 890170-CA 
Priority No. 14b 
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In the present appeal, R.O.A. seeks to overturn the summary decision of the Third 
Judicial District for Salt Lake County ordering R.O.A. to pay to Webb his accrued 
compensation of $342,747.00 under the employment agreement between Webb and 
R.O.A. (R. 966-70) 
The following facts were not disputed by R.O.A. in the summary 
judgment proceedings below. 
1. Since 1981, Webb has owned 20% of the stock of R.O.A. in joint 
tenancy with his wife. At all times relevant to this lawsuit, Webb was a member of the 
Board of Directors of R.O.A. and was also an employee of R.O.A. (R. 797; R. 518) 
2* Defendant Reagan is the president and the majority shareholder of 
R.O.A., owning 80% of the stock. Reagan is also a member of the Board of Directors 
of R.O.A. (R. 797) 
3. On or about July 1, 1981, in connection with the merger of Galaxy 
Outdoor Advertising and R.O.A., Webb entered into an Employment Agreement with 
R.O.A. (the "Agreement") whereby R.O.A. employed Webb as Chairman of the Board 
of Directors and Vice President of R.OA, commencing August 1, 1981 and continuing 
until August 1, 1986. (R. 695-697) The Agreement provided, among other things, that 
Webb would receive annual base compensation of $100,000 ("Base Compensation") plus 
additional compensation equal to one percent (1%) of the annual net sales of outdoor 
advertising of R.O.A. ("Additional Compensation"). (R. 695) 
4. Under the Agreement, Webb's duties were to include only those 
specific services requested of him by the Board of Directors of R.O.A. (R. 695) 
Section 6 of the Agreement provides that R.O.A. "may not terminate this Agreement 
for any reason other than fraud or gross malfeasance." (R. 695) The Agreement 
further provides that "the compensation which we have agreed upon for the five year 
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period is non-cancellable for any reason including death . . . ." (R. 700) The 
Agreement states that it was expected that Webb would devote the following 
percentages of his time to R.O.A.: 
1st year 50% 
2nd year 25% 
3rd year 12!/2% 
4th year 7!/2% 
5th year 5% 
5. Webb acted as Chairman of the Board and as Vice President 
during the entire term of the Agreement. (R. 691) 
6. R.O.A. has not disputed that the minutes of meetings and actions 
of the board of directors of R.O.A. during the term of the Agreement contain no 
request whatsoever that Webb perform any services for R.O.A. which were not fully 
and promptly performed. (R. 798) 
7. The audited financial statements and financial records of R.O.A. 
for each of the five years of the Agreement state that Webb earned, but did not 
receive, compensation in the following amounts: 
Total Cash Trades Total Amount 
Due* Paid Paid Paid Accrued 
$130,696 $ 86,051 $ 6,256 $ 92,307 $ 38,389 
134,715 86,524 2,158 88,682 46,033 
138,401 88,456 3,614 92,070 46,331 
141,721 58,517 616 59,133 82,588 
142,671 2,255 -0- 2,255 140,416 
$688,204 $312,644 $12,644 $334,447 $353,757 
Subsequent 
Payment $ 11,010 $342,747 
This figure includes $100,000 Base Compensation and Additional Compensation of 








8. Due to R.O.A.'s cash flow problems, on March 14, 1985, William 
* 
Reagan, Norman W. Clark, and Gerald Gray, who constituted a majority of the board 
of directors of R.O.A., voted in favor of and passed a resolution imposing a 
moratorium on the payment of Webb's compensation, effective April 1, 1985. Webb 
voted against this resolution. (R. 707) Since April 1, 1985, R.O.A. has failed and 
refused to pay to Webb either the Base Compensation or the Additional Compensation 
set forth in the Agreement. (R. 691) 
9. R.O.A. first took the position that it owes Webb nothing under the 
Agreement in this lawsuit. Since the moratorium on Webb's compensation, R.O.A. has 
consistently accrued his compensation as a long-term debt obligation of R.O.A on its 
unaudited and audited financial statements. (R. 710-751) These financial statements 
have been approved as accurate by the board of directors and by Reagan, as president 
of R.O.A. 
10. In a letter addressed to the board of directors of R.O.A., dated March 
13, 1985, R.O.A., through William Reagan, its president, stated: 
I would say that in the immediate future the company has no alternative but 
for me to loan it $120,000 by noon Friday. However, I am only interested in 
doing so if I know the $120,000 will be paid back immediately over the next 
five to six months. The company cannot do so if it continues to make 
payments on Roland's and my employment agreement on a current basis and 
I am suspicious that we may have the same problem again with one of the 
subsequent quarters. 
(R. at 754) 
11. In a letter addressed to William Reagan, dated March 27, 1985, Webb 
stated: 
It has become obvious to me that some drastic changes must take place if we 
are to survive as a viable entity. Even though a postponement has been 
placed on all management salaries, I do not believe this is the total answer to 
the company's solvency. 
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The very fact that the company cannot pay salaries to management 
puts them in violation of management contracts and makes them subject to 
litigation. Secondly, the obligation is still there, and must be paid sooner or 
later. 
(R. at 759) 
12. In a responsive letter addressed to Dennis Webb (Roland Webb's son), 
dated July 1, 1985, R.O.A., through William Reagan, its president, stated: 
In regard to your statement that there has been a default on [Roland Webb's] 
agreements, basically I feel this is a strained interpretation of what has been a 
temporary moratorium . . . . 
(R. at 773) 
13. In a letter addressed to Webb, dated September 18, 1985, R.O.A., 
through William Reagan, its president, stated: 
I would estimate that within 12 months we should be able to accumulate the 
$310,000 required to satisfy the board resolution so that we can recommence 
payments under our management agreement. 
(R. at 780) 
14. In a letter addressed to Roland Webb, dated February 18, 1986, 
R.O.A., through William Reagan, its president, stated: 
That we meet in late March after we have made, or have not made, the 
March 15 interest payment to Mass Mutual with Roland, Duane, Dennis, 
Norm, and me to discuss the following items: . . . 2) what amount, through 
judicious planning and careful budgeting, can the company pay to Roland on 
a monthly basis in the form of management fees and/or for the purchase of 
his stock? 
(R. at 784) 
15. In a letter addressed to Roland Webb, dated May 16, 1986, R.O.A., 
through William Reagan, its president, stated: 
I attributed the value to Palmer [Outdoor Advertising] of approximately 
$1,700,000, and the other stock, employment agreement, management fees, 
and other obligations of R.O.A. to Roland of $500,000. I have discounted the 
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accrued management fees because of the fact that they will be turned from 
ordinary income to capital gains. . . . 
(R. at 791) 
16. In a letter addressed to Roland and Bessie Webb dated July 18, 1986, 
R.O.A., through William Reagan, its president, stated: 
As a follow-up to our luncheon conversation the other day in regard to the 
disposition of your interest in Reagan Outdoor Advertising and the resolution 
of your employment agreement, it is my understanding that you will come 
forward with some proposal. . . . I would estimate the total indebtedness of 
the company at this time to be somewhere in the $9,000,000 to $9,440,000 
range, consisting predominantly of $7,000,000 to Mass Mutual and refinance 
the prepayment penalty of $800,000. There is approximately $360,000 to you, 
and approximately $1,000,000 to me. . . . 
(R. at 793) (emphasis added) 
17. In its Answer to Webb's complaint, R.O.A. has claimed, for the first 
time, that no compensation is owed Webb under the Agreement because Webb 
allegedly breached the Agreement. (R. 693) Yet even after this action was filed, 
R.O.A. continued to make token payments and, in a letter addressed to Webb dated 
August 4, 1987, R.O.A., through its officer, Norman Clark, stated: 
Enclosed are the June, 1987, financial statements in the preliminary July sales 
figures. 
One thing you should note is the fact that these statements reflect your 
management fees but do not reflect [William Reagan's]. His have been noted 
in the audit reports as footnotes rather than on the statements themselves. 
(R. at 787) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
It was undisputed in the proceedings below that Webb and R.O.A. entered 
into a valid and binding employment agreement. It was further undisputed that since 
April 1, 1985, R.O.A. has accrued on its books (as reflected in its audited financial 
statements) the compensation payable to Webb under the Agreement. It was further 
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undisputed that in correspondence between the parties, R.O.A. consistently 
acknowledged Webb^s right to receive the accrued compensation and, until this suit was 
filed, has never claimed that Webb breached the Agreement. R.O.A.'s assertions of 
breach of the Agreement are inconsistent with the clear language of the Agreement 
and the corporate records of R.O.A. 
The lower court properly refused to consider extrinsic parole evidence 
submitted by Reagan to vary the terms of the Agreement. R.O.A. does not assert that 
any of the terms of the Agreement are ambiguous. The Agreement is the final, 
integrated contract of the parties. 
Webb did not waive any right to receive his compensation under the 
Agreement. He made repeated demands on R.O.A. and on Reagan that it be paid. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I: R.O.A.'s Numerous and Uncontroverted Admissions of Liability Are 
Sufficient to Warrant Summary Judgment. 
A. The Financial Statements of R.O.A. Constitute Uncontroverted 
Admissions by R.O.A. of the Validity of Webb's Claims for Accrued 
Compensation. 
As a general rule, the financial statements of a corporation are admissions by 
the corporation of the truth of matters contained therein. Woodstock Enterprises, Inc. 
v. International Mooring and Marine, Inc., 524 So.2d 1313, 1321 (La. App. 
1988) (information contained in corporation's financial statements constitutes admission 
against interest); In re Marriage of Brooks, 742 S.W.2d 585, 588 (Mo. App. 
1987)(financial statements constitute admissions against interest); see also Utah R. 
Evidence 801(d)(2). Wigmore on Evidence provides: ,f[I]n ordinary actions for the 
price of goods or services, the opponent's account book entries are of course receivable 
as admissions against himself." 4 Wigmore on Evidence § 1073 (Chadbourne Rev. 
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1972). This is true whether the financial statements are prepared by the company's 
own accountants or by an independent firm hired by the company to perform such 
duties. Id; see Courtney v. Courtney. 542 P.2d 164, 167 (Alaska 1975)(use of financial 
statement in loan application is an admission); see also Falker v. Samperi, 461 A.2d 
681, 688 (Conn. 1983)(use of independent survey is adoptive admission); Oxley v. 
Linton Plywood Ass'n, 284 P.2d 767, 776 (Ore. 1955)(use of survey in registration 
statement is an admission of facts contained therein). 
The audited and unaudited financial statements of R.O.A. disclose accrued 
compensation payable to Webb. The audited financial statement of R.O.A. for the 
year ended July 31, 1986 (the end of the employment term), reveals the following: 
Amount owed to Roland Webb, which $353,757 
will not be paid within one year as 
a result of the moratorium placed 
on payments to officers by the Board 
of Directors - See Note H. 
Note H to the July 31, 1986 audited financial statement states: 
NOTE H - COMMITMENTS AND CONTINGENCIES: 
REAGAN WEBB 
Unpaid Balance Accrued @ 7/31/85 $ -0- $ 213,341 
Prior Year Accrual Paid During Year -0- (2,255) 
Amount Earned During Current Year -0- 142,671 
Current Year Earnings Paid -0- -0-
Balance Accrued and Unpaid @ 7/31/86 $ -0- $ 353 J57 
These audited financial statements were addressed and delivered to each of 
the stockholders and directors of R.O.A. As of June 30, 1987, one year after this 
lawsuit began, the unaudited financial statements of R.O.A. continued to show an 
account payable to Webb for outstanding management fees. Even Norman Clark's 
affidavit, filed by R.O.A. in opposition to summary judgment, admits that R.O.A. owes 
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Webb $343,570.39, which is more than the $342,747 requested by Webb in the lower 
court. (R. 878, 880) These financial statements have never been challenged, amended 
or modified by R.O.A. and R.O.A. has never questioned the compensation owed to 
Webb until Webb filed this action to recover it. 
The courts that have addressed similar fact situations have consistently 
required parties to abide by their own financial statements concerning debts owed and 
have found such evidence sufficient to support summary judgment. Buxton v. 
Diversified Resources Corporation, 634 F.2d 1313, 1319 (10th Cir. 1980)(debt shown on 
financial statement is sufficient for summary judgment that debt is owed). In City of 
Houston v. Moody, 572 S.W.2d 13, 15 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978), for example, the Texas 
Court of Appeals rejected the city's argument that general obligation bonds were not 
valid, concluding that ,f[t]he 1959 contract, the minutes of the . . . board meeting, and 
the testimony of Mr. Moody [the holder], and continued reference to the debts in the 
audits and financial statements of the District are all evidence of Mr. Binnion's [the 
president's] authority to bind the District." 
In Tyler Gilman Corp. v. Williams, 221 S.E.2d 129, 130 (Vir. 1976), an action 
brought by the personal representative of a shareholder seeking to enforce a 
promissory note against the corporation, the personal representative offered as evidence 
of the indebtedness a financial statement of the corporation, addressed to the board of 
directors and stockholders, which included the following: "Nc5te payable, A.T. Gilman 
$40,000." The Virginia Supreme Court upheld the lower court's decision allowing the 
claim, stating: 
[T]he statement was formally addressed to the corporation's stockholders and 
directors. Mrs. Gilman was one of the corporation's two stockholders and 
one of its directors. She could hardly be termed a stranger with respect to 
the information contained in the statement concerning indebtedness owed her. 
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Id. at 131. The court observed that the corporation's liability on the note "was never 
questioned" until suit was brought. Id. at 130-31. 
In Stee v. "L" Monte Industries. Inc., 247 N.W.2d 641 (N.D. 1976), Stee, an 
engineer, introduced the financial statement of the corporation, prepared by 
independent accountants, showing an account payable of $8,503.98 to Stee for services. 
In upholding Stee's claim, the North Dakota Supreme Court stated, "'L' Monte, 
through its accountants, established on January 31, 1973, that the sum owed Stee was 
$8,503.98. Neither 'L' Monte nor Boehm [its president] can now be heard to complain 
that the amount of the fee was uncertain on February 1, 1973." Id. at 646; see also, 
Manlin v. Manlin, 638 S.W.2d 295, 296 (Mo. App. 1982)(financial statement entries are 
admissions against interest). 
B. Undisputed Correspondence Between R.O.A. and Webb Constitute 
Further Admissions by R.O.A. of the Validity of Webb's claim for 
Accrued Compensation. 
The numerous letters that passed between R.O.A. and Webb since 1985 
consistently confirmed R.O.A.'s obligation to Webb for the amount of the accrued 
management fees. R.O.A. never questioned Webb's right to receive the amounts called 
for under the Agreement. As of July 18, 1986, R.O.A. acknowledged that it owed 
Webb "approximately $360,000." (R. 793) By letter to Webb dated August 4, 1987, 
after the commencement of this action, R.O.A. stated, "One thing that you should note 
is the fact that these [financial] statements reflect your management fees but do not 
reflect Bill's." (R. 787) 
These letters constitute further express admissions that Webb's accrued 
management fees are valid obligations of R.O.A. Nowhere, either in the lower court 
or on appeal, has R.O.A. attempted to dispute, or even explain, the repeated 
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acknowledgments in its financial statements and correspondence of Webb's entitlement 
to his accrued management fees. 
C. R.O.A.'s Contention That Webb Did Not Work Sufficient Hours to 
Earn His Salary Fails to Controvert the Record and Ignores the 
Express Terms of the Employment Agreement. 
R.O.A.'s argument that Webb worked less than 40 hours per week and 
therefore was in breach of the Agreement cannot be taken seriously. The Agreement 
only required him to devote from 50% to 5% of his time to R.O.A. R.O.A.'s 
argument that Webb spent time working on personal matters is also insufficient to 
avoid summary judgment. The Agreement specifically allowed Webb to work on 
personal matters (R. 700) and there is no evidence in the Record that Webb's personal 
matters interfered with Webb's work for R.O.A. Reagan's assertions of breach are not 
relevant because Webb was only answerable to the board of directors, not to Reagan 
personally. At no time, either in the financial statements, the correspondence or the 
minutes of the board of directors has there ever been any indication that Webb was in 
breach of his employment contract. 
POINT II: Parole Evidence is Inadmissible to Change the Terms of the 
Employment Agreement. 
A. The Terms of the Agreement Are Not Ambiguous. 
R.O.A. goes to considerable lengths to demonstrate why the employment 
agreement means something other than what it says. However, a simple review of the 
Agreement confirms that the District Court correctly refused to consider extrinsic 
evidence offered by R.O.A. to vary the terms of the Agreement. It is unquestionably 
the law in Utah that if R.O.A. intends to vary the terms of a written contract, it must 
demonstrate an ambiguity in the Agreement. ff[0]nly where the language is uncertain 
and ambiguous need extrinsic evidence be resorted to." Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248, 
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1251 (Utah 1980). The ambiguity must appear on the face of the document itself. 
"When a contract is clear on its face, extrinsic or parol evidence is generally not 
admissible to explain the intent of the contract." Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 
1292, 1293 (Utah 1983). 
In Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner. 636 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1981), the Utah 
Supreme Court held, "It is only when an ambiguity exists which cannot be reconciled by 
an objective and reasonable interpretation of the contract as a whole that resort may 
be had to the use of extrinsic evidence." Id. at 1062; see Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nafl 
Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987)("If the contract language is ambiguous or 
uncertain after careful consideration of the whole integration, only then should a court 
consider extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' intent."). 
R.O.A. did not argue in the lower court and does not argue in this appeal 
that any of the terms of the Agreement are ambiguous. The reason is obvious; the 
contract could not have been drafted any clearer. R.O.A. cannot create an ambiguity 
in the Agreement simply by straining the language to add terms and conditions not 
present. With regard to finding an ambiguity in a contract the Utah Supreme Court 
has stated, '"That requirement is not satisfied because a party may get a different 
meaning by placing a forced or strained construction on it in accordance with his 
interest. The test to be applied is: would the meaning be plain to a person of ordinary 
intelligence and understanding, viewing the matter fairly and reasonably, in accordance 
with the usual and natural meaning of the words, and in light of the 
circumstances . . . ."' Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Associates. 752 P.2d 892, 896 
(Utah 1988)(quoting Auto Lease Co. v. Central Mutual Insurance Co.. 27 Utah 2d 169, 
493 P.2d 1003, 1005 (1972)). "Contract terms are not necessarily ambiguous simply 
because one party seeks to endow them with a different meaning than that relied on by 
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the drafter." Id. at 895 (citations omitted); see Jones v. Hinckle, 611 P.2d 733, 735 
(Utah 1980)("Contract provisions are not rendered ambiguous merely by the fact that 
the parties urge diverse interpretations."). 
B. The Employment Agreement Was Integrated. 
R.O.A. attempts to circumvent the parole evidence rule's restriction on 
extrinsic evidence by stating that, because terms were missing, the contract was not 
integrated.7 R.O.A. has failed to offer any evidence that the parties did not intend the 
Agreement to be the final, complete understanding of the parties at the time it was 
executed. The Agreement was a formal contract drafted by legal counsel to govern a 
five-year employment relationship involving large sums of money. R.O.A. has 
presented no evidence that the Agreement was only preliminary to a more final 
1
 In doing so R.O.A. violates the integration rule established by the cases cited in 
its own brief. Under this rule, only evidence as to the circumstances surrounding the 
execution of the contract is admissible to determine whether the contract is "integrated" 
and represents the final, complete agreement of the parties. Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. 
Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261, 501 P.2d 266, 270 (1972). Evidence concerning the parties' 
intent under the terms of the contract is not admissible on the issue of integration. . "In 
determining the issue of the completeness of the integration of writing, extrinsic 
evidence to the writing is inadmissible. Parole testimony is admissible to show the 
circumstances under which the agreement was made . . . ." Id. As stated by Williston 
on Contracts: 
If we may go outside the instrument to prove that there was a 
stipulation not contained in it, and so that only part of the contract 
was put in writing, and then because of that fact, enforce the oral 
stipulation, there will be little value left in the [parole evidence] rule 
itself. 
Williston on Contracts, § 633, p. 1016 (1961). The evidence offered by R.O.A. on 
integration consisted of statements by Reagan to the effect that R.O.A. must have 
sufficient cash available to it before the 1% gross sales provision would be paid to 
Webb. (Appellants' Brief at 5, R. 883) 
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agreement. There can be no question that the Agreement is the final understanding of 
the parties. 
Long ago the Utah Supreme Court resolved this issue, stating "The rule is 
well-settled that, where the parties have reduced to writing what appears to be a 
complete and certain agreement, it will, in the absence of fraud, be conclusively 
presumed that the writing contained the whole of the agreement between the parties, 
that it is a complete memorial of such agreement, and that parol evidence of 
contemporaneous conversations, representations, or statements will not be received for 
the purpose of varying or adding to the terms of the written document." B.T. Moran, 
Inc. v. First Security Corp., 82 Utah 316, 24 P.2d 384, 389 (1933). 
G The Intent of the Parties is Clear from the Face of the Agreement. 
R.O.A.'s construction of the Agreement is not only inadmissible, it is 
unreasonable. Certainly no minority shareholder would condition receiving his salary 
on sufficient money being available to pay it. Accepting R.O.A.'s interpretation would 
essentially strip Webb of a large part of his accrued compensation. "[W]here there is a 
choice, an interpretation which will bring about an equitable result will be preferred 
over a harsh or inequitable one." Wingets, Inc. v. Bitters, 500 P.2d 1007, 1010 (Utah 
1972)(citations omitted). The Utah Supreme Court has, in the past, wisely stated that 
courts "will not rewrite a contract to supply terms which the parties omitted." Hal 
Taylor Ass, v. Union America, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982)(citing Tomino v. 
Greater Park City Co., 570 P.2d 698 (Utah 1977). 
POINT III: Webb Did Not Waive His Right to Receive Compensation Under the 
Agreement. 
The correspondence between the parties and the minutes of the board of 
directors of R.O.A. are replete with demands by Webb to receive his compensation. 
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Webb voted against the moratorium on salaries instituted by Reagan but, as a minority 
shareholder, was rebuffed by Reagan. As aptly stated by the Utah Court of Appeals in 
the prior appeal of this case: "Waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known 
right. Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430, 431 (Utah 1983). 'It must be distinctly made, 
although it may be express or implied.' Id. (quoting American Savings & Loan Ass'n v. 
Blomquist 21 Utah 2d 289, 292, 445 P.2d 1, 3 (1968))." Webb v. R.O.A. General Inc., 
773 P.2d 834, 839 (Utah App. 1989). 
CONCLUSION 
The uncontroverted facts and the legal authorities discussed above 
demonstrate, as a matter of law, that: 
1) Webb and R.O.A. entered into a valid and binding employment 
agreement which represented the complete understanding of the parties; 
2) R.O.A. has breached the employment agreement by failing to pay to 
Webb the compensation required by the agreement; and 
3) R.O.A. has repeatedly acknowledged that Webb's compensation under 
the agreement is due and owing to Webb in the amount of $342,747. 
For the reasons stated above, this Court should affirm the judgment by the 
lower court ordering R.O.A. to pay to Webb the accrued employment compensation 
pursuant to the Agreement. 
DATED this /3$ day of October, 1989. 
LeBOEUF, LAMB, LEIBY & MacRAE 
By: ^ /Z^e*^ drftofa^ 
SttTpheli M. TumbliTT 
1000 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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